Introduction
The aesthetic production processes in the field of the arts are regarded quite naturally as creative processes, without questioning what creativity actually is in its processuality. In a similar way, this also applies to the acting process in the performing arts. Thus, one can observe that the terms artistic work and creativity are generally used as a pair of related terms or even as synonyms. This conflation, which is regarded as established, is generally not really questioned, but on the contrary, as a ‘natural attitude’ adopted doubtlessly by all groups involved in the aesthetic production process (in the aesthetic production process in acting: actor-audience in the context of a co-presence/co-production) without critically examining the closer connections between artistic work and creativity. If, however, one takes a closer look at the structures of creative processes, one inevitably cannot avoid questioning the conditions of creativity that make the creative process possible.
In this chapter, I would like to subject the terms creativity and artistic work to a more detailed examination, since these seem to be the central terms that need to be re-evaluated within the framework of creative processes by including bodily awareness.
Creativity and artistic work in the focus of creative processes
Thus creativity should not be reduced to the final result of the artistic work process, which is accessible to everyone and which is then assessed as more or less creative. Nor is creativity a mental construct that subsequently takes shape within a materialization process. Rather, creativity, understood as. Creativity is closely linked to the concept of inspiration, which can bring us closer to what can be meant by creativity. Inspiration, derived from the Latin inspiratio, in the sense of ensoulment, describes an afflatus or an unexpected, sudden idea, which, like the words ‘afflatus’ or ‘sudden idea’ is something that unexpectedly hits us from the outside, is given to us or invades us and leads the affected person in a direction that was previously not available. Moreover, the sudden occurring inspiration is usually in accordance with the thematic attention of the concerned person and is comparable to a kind of impulse energy that leads one thing or a problem in a certain direction. Thus, Gendlin’s felt sense, as a bodily reaction to something that wants to be heard, felt, perceived (Gendlin, 1998), can be seen as an inspiration for subsequent action and can thus be used as a stimulus for creative action within the framework of aesthetic production process in acting. In my experience, this use of what I would like to call body-intelligence, which provides me with information and impulses far beyond what was previously thought of, or already known, is an unlimited source of artistic inspiration and a compass for creative action of all kinds.
In this context, Hermann Schmitz’s thoughts on a philosophy of the body from his treatises on a New Phenomenology (2009) needs to be included, in which he deals in detail with the significance of the body for man’s Dasein in the world. Schmitz strives for a re-evaluation of the idea of subjectivity by focusing on the affective involvement of a human being in relation to something or someone as a basic condition for directed attention and thus for any kind of awareness. In his remarks on a New Phenomenology, he places the ‘affective involvement’ (Schmitz, 2011, p. 2) of the observer at the center of the thought of an intentionally oriented relationship between the observer and object of its awareness, and thus places the subjective interest of the observer in something or someone as the decisive impulse for the constitution of a phenomenon in the foreground. Thus, ‘all facts of affective involvement […] are subjective for someone’ (Schmitz, 2011, p. 73). Schmitz sees this thought in close connection with what man feels on a pre-theoretical level within a bodily experience in relation to something. He assumes that, for something to appear to us at all, our attention must first be directed to what is to appear. In his opinion, this is awakened by the affective involvement of the observer, which in turn can be seen as a prerequisite for the observer to ultimately perceive something as a phenomenon.
However, with the sudden turn of attention to a new event which is immediately experienced by someone as a bodily reaction in the form of a contraction or expansion, both terms which Schmitz mentions as fundamental dynamics of the body in connection with sensible states, he explicitly emphasizes that the possibility in man to ‘find himself in the here and now can only be explained in relation to the maximum of the contraction, the presence exposed by the sudden appearance of the new, in an absolute place, in an absolute moment’ (Schmitz, 2011, p. 3). Schmitz thus assumes that what suddenly appears is usually characterized by bodily contraction that strives for expansion, and which can be achieved by an action appropriate to the situation. Schmitz designates the field of sensible states, which can be experienced bodily through contraction and expansion, as ‘corporeal stirrings’ (Schmitz, 2011, p. 4).
This sudden occurrence of the new, which, as mentioned above, can be perceived as contraction and expansion is directly related to Gendlin’s remarks on felt sense (1998, p. 30) in the context of his Focusing process (1998, p. 29). In my opinion, what Schmitz describes as that which suddenly appears in the body of a human being can be understood as the first stage of an emerging felt sense, which Gendlin then defines more closely through a symbolization process, experienced through a felt shift (1998, p. 31), which leads to fundamental changes within a person and can be evaluated in its bodily dimension as an inspiration impulse for action, set in motion by it. Gendlin describes ‘the process of change [as] a natural process and is felt by the body as such’ (1998, p. 28). Schmitz’s act of bodily expansion can therefore be compared with Gendlin’s ‘inner act’ (1998, p. 22) or with the ‘inner movement’ he describes in this context.
Body philosophy and the aesthetic production process in acting
If one now attempts to transfer Gendlin’s and Schmitz’s postulation of a body philosophy to the aesthetic production process in acting, one quickly realizes that their theoretical positioning already carries within itself the practical approach demanded in the acting process. This can already be explained by the fact that their thinking refers to the sensible body and therefore concepts such as felt sense, in the sense of an inner movement, or contraction and expansion, as fundamental dynamics of the bodily experience, can be experienced by the actor immediately on his own body and used as such by him. Moreover, Schmitz’s emphasized affective involvement can be quickly experienced and used by the actor as a first hint and impulse for action. At this point, however, it should be noted that, unlike real life, the aesthetic production process in acting is not related to the personal life of the actor, sensed as contraction and expansion, but rather as an empathic achievement of the actor, i.e. the willingness and ability to empathize with the attitudes of other people. This process of detachment, by the actor’s non-identification with the fictive theatrical role, can be described on two different levels. First, on the level of a fictionally existing human being, in the form of a theatrical figure on an abstract linguistic sign level and then on the level of partner work within the framework of rehearsal work.
On the first level this is done to understand better the fictive theatrical figure, while on the second level a creative production process can be set in motion by the actor. I would like to describe this process with the term ‘scenic communication’, which delineates an inspirational, creative working process in which the intentional action demanded by the actor is set in motion by new offers of action on the part of the partner. As a result, the inspiration required in the artistic working process always emanates from the partner through his offer of action, which can then be experienced by the actor as a contraction and expansion of the body and leads him to an analogous action. This action can then be experienced by the partner as inspiration in the same physical way. Such an ongoing, interdependent process can be compared in the context of the partner’s work with the process of co-production between actor and audience within a performance, which Fischer-Lichte calls a feedback loop (2004, p. 59) in her work on the aesthetics of the performative even though this process is positioned by Fischer-Lichte under different circumstances and explicitly between actor and audience. The process as such, in my opinion, takes place in a similar way and leads to a development of the working process on stage between the actors involved in the aesthetic production process on the basis of a mutually motivated bodily experience of the action material offered by the particular partner.
Bodily experience as a fundamental condition for creativity
My investigations in the field of theoretical and practical acting research show that bodily experience in the form of bodily awareness is a fundamental condition for creativity in the artistic aesthetic production process. Bodily awareness, i.e. the experience of the world through its resonance in the living body, is therefore at the centre of creative action in the framework of aesthetic production processes. Thus, also in the aesthetic acting production process, provided by the fact that the phenomenological body of the actor, both in its subjective and objective dimensions, can be seen as a reference for processuality.
The philosophical tradition since Democritus, also the philosophy of Christianity and the Middle Ages and not forgetting the modernity influenced by the natural sciences promote a body-mind dualism and thus leave no space for the involuntary life experiences of the human being, as mentioned by Gendlin and Schmitz. The separation between body and mind, in which the subject thinks separately from the object, can be overcome theoretically and practically by a point of view, shaped by phenomenology, which understands the subject as a living organism and in this sense places the conscious life experience of the body in the foreground. In this way it is possible to experience the body in its corporeality, which emphasizes its processual structure and extends the sensed body beyond the boundaries of the biological body. I would even like to go one step further and emphasize that without the premise of bodily awareness and experience, as a condition and prerequisite for the understanding of being in the world, and in the same way a bodily awareness of the actor’s own state of being in the world surrounding him (text, role, stage partner and other aesthetic parameters) conceived and demanded in this sense, creative acting within the framework of aesthetic production process in acting, would not be possible.
Definitely, an aesthetic production process in acting shaped by bodily awareness should keep an eye on the fundamental objective-body-subjective-body question and a problem arising from both concepts, which is initially of an etymological nature, in order to advance to what bodily awareness ultimately constitutes.
Unlike other languages, the German language distinguishes between the objective body and the subjective body. The discussion about the difference between the objective body and the subjective body is etymologically founded in the German language. The concept of the subjective body is directly connected with the concept of life. Thus the Middle High German ‘lîp’ (Weddige, 2007, p.115) designates body and life at the same time, which then developed into an understanding of the body in the sense of a living body or an individual feeling and emphasizes the subjective dimension of the objective-body-subjective-body theme that can be felt and experienced, whereas the objective body rather means the objectively observable and anatomical-biological dimension.
In his philosophical-anthropological theory of the eccentric positionality (Plessner, 1975) of the human being, Plessner addresses precisely the objective-body-subjective-body problem through his thesis of the entanglement of corporeality in the body (Plessner, 1980, p. 368). He thus attempts to distinguish himself from Cartesian thought, which denies the dimension of a living body and reduces the body to its physically determinable characteristics (1980, p. 326), emphasizing a substantial difference between body and soul (Plessner, 1982, p. 232). He coined the concept of eccentric positionality in his main work ‘Die Stufen der Organisation und der Mensch’ (‘The levels of Organization and Man’), in which the subjective body can be perceived and felt as a body relative to its environment. Plessner thereby emphasizes the reflexivity, in the sense that man has his body (1982, p. 236). He verbalizes it this way: ‘As a subjective body, I am an outer thing that stands in the way of other bodies or makes space and, unlike my body’s sense of self, forces me to perceive and assess distances and capacities’ (Plessner 1980, p. 369). Plessner tries to explain this entanglement of being and having a body using the example of the embodiment process by the actor, since in his opinion the problem of entanglement of the subjective body in the objective body is particularly evident here. (1980, p. 391).
Physicality and the concept of movement as a condition for the constitution of objects
When one speaks of physicality, the concept of movement is of course always in our mind. In a phenomenological approach to acting, it is not primarily a matter of movement as a purely physical act, but of the experience of body movement in the form of a movement of the subjective body. The ability of the human body to move is also of great importance for Husserl, especially with regard to the constitution of perceptive reality and here primarily the kinaesthetic abilities with regard to the experience of space and spatial objects. The kinaesthetic consciousness mentioned by Husserl represents a kind of bodily self-awareness, and sees it as a condition in relation to the constitution of objects of awareness (Hua 16, p. 189; Hua 11, pp. 14–15, Hua 4, p. 66; Hua 16, p. 159; Hua 6, p. 109). If we look more closely at the term kinaesthesia, we find that it is composed of two word roots, kinesis, meaning movement, and aisthesis, meaning sensation. Etymologically, kinaesthesia means sensation of movement. Thus, according to Husserl, the subjective body is not only the sentient body, but also the organ of movement (Hua 5, p. 120). In this sense, kinaesthesia can be described as the way in which the movement carried out by the subjective body, and also perceived by it (as an organ of perception), is experienced internally. This ability is of great importance for the actor, as it provides him with orientation assistance within the acting process on two levels, which is guaranteed by the bodily experience described above. This ‘bodily orientation assistance’, as I would like to call it, allows the actor to act creatively through an intentionally directed bodily experience both in the creative production phase within the rehearsal work and in the reproduction phase of a movement score created during the rehearsal work within a performance. The body experience in the creative production phase, appearing as felt sense, is innovatively motivated, whereas in the reproduction phase, meaning the reproduction of the movement score created in the production phase, enables the actor to accompany it within a self-objectification process (see below), in the sense of a physical entanglement of the subjective body and objective body described by Plessner, in its entire dimension of realization.
When one speaks of movement in the context of an aesthetic production process in acting oriented by bodily awareness, the kinesthetic ability of the body emphasized by Husserl plays an important role. Consequently, someone can deduce that, in connection with physicality, two dimensions of movement are simultaneously involved in the acting process.
On the one hand the outer movement as a condition for a spatial change or for a physical contact with objects and on the other hand the inner movement, in the sense of the inner act researched by Gendlin and the concept of contraction and expansion emphasized by Schmitz, as well as the kinaesthetic consciousness according to Husserl. Husserl goes so far as to say that the perceptual intentionality depends on a physically moving subject (Hua 16, p. 176). It should therefore be noted that for Husserl the decisive factor is not the fact that we can be aware of movement, but that awareness presupposes movement as a condition. Thus, the body in its bodily dimension is the instance that makes the subject’s experiences possible and at the same time holds a constitutive role in any kind of awareness (Hua 4, p. 144; Hua 11, p. 13).
In this way, the relationship between subjectivity and corporeality within aesthetic production processes in acting should be clarified in any case in order to reach a practical implementation of Husserl’s thesis of movement as a condition of awareness. According to Husserl then, the original consciousness of the life of a subject does not consist in the experience of the subjective body as a spatially expanding object (Hua 13, p. 240), but in an act of self-objectification that takes place through the consciousness of the subjective body without any thematic connection. In this way the consciousness of the subjective body makes the act of self-objectification possible in the first place. It should therefore be noted that, according to Husserl, the subjective body is never experienced as an object in an objective space. One therefore is not able to be aware of it out of himself, but always as an experience of the subjective body. This is due to the mere fact that the subjective body doesn’t exist perspectively and one does not exist just for himself, in the sense of belonging to a spatial object (body as object). Rather, the body is becoming ‘I do, I can’ (Hua 11, p. 14) and thus can be seen as an acting body within the framework of a deliberately executed movement potential. In other words, if my body moves and acts, it’s me who is moving and acting (Hua 14, p. 540). Zahavi argues that ‘the constitution of the body as an object is not an activity exercised by a disembodied subject. Rather, it is a self-objectification of the functioning subjective body. It is carried out by a subject that already exists bodily’(Zahavi, 2003, p. 106), and is thus present.
In this context Gendlin mentions in his book A Process Model (Gendlin, 2015) body and environment as an inseparable entity, describing the body as a ‘non-representative compaction (with) the environment’ (2015, p. 49). He distinguishes four types of environment to which the body is related. Most relevant to the actor’s work seems to be the environment, which he calls environment 2 and which he describes as identical to the living process of the organism. According to Gendlin the description of living processes is always a single event that can be viewed from two sides. Once from the body and once from the environment. However, the term environment is not used here in the sense of an environment that surrounds everything, but in the sense of an environment that participates in the life process (2015, p. 49–50). Both body and environment imply each other, which Gendlin emphasizes as a mutual implication of body and environment. Such an implication of body and environment within living processes, however, cannot be described as iconic and representative, since body and environment usually have a different appearance. For Gendlin, body and environment in this process model are events that imply each other in the sense of deriving from each other.
Husserl’s interplay of corporality, subjectivity, intersubjectivity and the world, as well as Gendlin’s Process Model can, in my opinion, be decisive factors in a phenomenologically- influenced aesthetic production process in acting. As a rule, the audience is fixed in their visual perception of the theatrical figures on stage due to a particular seating perspective. So, it is the task of the actor to create other possibilities of appearance of a theatrical figure on stage perceptible for the audience. The actor’s mobility in space enables him/her to constantly change his/her perspective in space and thus gives the audience the opportunity to perceive new facets of the theatrical figure on stage so that they are able to complete their subjective image of what they are seeing. In addition, Gendlin’s Process Model, in the form of a constant spacing of something, demonstrates the mutual implication of body and environment within a living process and provides an important impulse for creative working process.
Presence on stage
When I speak of ‘presence’ in this context, I mean attendance, the physical presence of something that is to appear or to be emphasized in a special way. Concerning a person, the attention focuses on the way the person speaks and moves. In this case the importance does not primarily lie in the different behavioral conspicuities of this person while appearing to us, but in its particular individual radiance, which is revealed to us in a dimension of space and time. Within the framework of aesthetic production processes in acting one speaks of ‘stage presence’. However, the phenomenon of stage presence, which is to be regarded as an aesthetic phenomenon, is not so much about the fact that an actor on stage is noticeable or present or available, but rather about the quality of the performance, the quality of an actor who seems to have a special charisma on stage. It seems to be of particular importance to focus on both, the physical and bodily aspect, since on the one hand the material presence of the objective body is meant and on the other hand we have to deal with the sentient presence of the subjective body. In this context, I would like to draw your attention back to the different use of the terms ‘objective body’ and ‘subjective’ body. Gernot Böhme, who describes in his book Leibsein als Aufgabe the difference between the two concepts, in the ‘difference between self-awareness and experience of others’ (Böhme, 2003, p. 12), explains that we use the term ‘[…] objective body to describe the object that we know as our body in our lifetime, but from the perspective of experience of the other, i.e. how it appears in the medical view, how it is researched scientifically and how it is manipulated by external interventions’ (2003, p. 12). In contrast, he describes the term ‘subjective body’ as the object that we know as our body insofar, as it is given to us in self-awareness (2003, p. 12).
According to Böhme, the important difference between self-awareness and experience of the other lies in ‘being affected, that means the fact that the body is my body and I inevitably have to cope with what happens to me through it, be it in burden or lust’ (2003, p. 12). He emphasizes that ‘self-awareness in which the body is given […] the bodily feeling or the subjective body […] is the spatial distribution of this feeling itself’ (2003, p. 13). On the other hand, the experience of the other is the encounter with ourselves as an ‘object, as a fact’ (2003, p. 13). Böhme explicitly points to the structural differences between the two concepts, considering it therefore impossible to equate the two concepts, although the great endeavor is to integrate the objective body and the subjective body harmoniously in our lives (2003, p. 13). Jonas tries to explain the difference of both terms by the difference in the perspective (from the inside and outside). He means that ‘thanks to the fact that we ourselves are living bodies, we […] have knowledge from within’ (Jonas, 1973, p. 124). He continues this thought by stressing that we, as ‘living material things ourselves, […] have to look somehow through peepholes of our self-awareness in the inwardness of our substance’ (1973, p. 142). Böhme’s concern corresponds at that point with Schmitz’s affective involvement, which, as already mentioned, refers to the subjective involvement of a person in relation to its surroundings within its particular presence and in this way it describes the bodily feeling of the affectively involved person.
Acting and feelings
Böhme and Schmitz are also very close in their theoretical explanations in another important area, the area of feelings. Both Böhme and Schmitz see feelings as ‘spatial, but placeless, poured out atmospheres’ (Schmitz, 1998, p. 22). Schmitz speaks of feelings as demanding atmospheres, ‘which, thanks to their placeless outpouring nature in the particular current environment, are totally demanding and lead to conflict when contrary atmospheres collide’ (1998, p. 23). He distinguishes between feelings themselves, as spatially poured out atmospheres and sensing of feelings. If it is a matter of being involved by feelings and not just a simple perception of atmospheres, then it is always a question of being bodily affected by them, which are consecutively materialized in expansive gestures by the affectively involved people (1998, p. 26). Of course, the processes described naturally have effect in a person’s everyday life, where the distance to the event is rather small due to the subjective involvement and the bodily affection of a person in relation to the event that is taking place and therefore a rational approach, which presupposes a certain distance to the event, is not given.
This process is different in the context of an aesthetic of production and thus also in aesthetic production processes in acting. Aesthetic production processes in acting, based on phenomenological thoughts, cannot be about the subjective reality of the actor, but rather about the materialization/embodiment of the fictitious reality of a theatrical figure as it appears in the consciousness of the actor. Due to the difference of both realities, the actor is able to understand the different nature of both realities. An identification of the actor with the theatrical figure can be excluded. Thus, opening the door for a more distanced, rational approach for the actor. This distance from the fictitious reality of the theatrical figure is necessary in order to exclude the path via personal identification with it. The embodiment process on behalf of the actor naturally also involves the most credible portrayal of certain situational emotionalities of the fictive theatrical figure. If one agrees with Böhme and Schmitz in their assessment of the feelings as atmospheres, placeless pouring into the space, the aesthetic production process then concentrates on the creation of such atmospheres. According to Böhme, it is about ‘dealing with material conditions’ (Böhme, 2013, p. 105) that create such kind of atmospheres. On behalf of the actor, this can only happen through the constitution of movement, whereby it is less a matter of ‘what’ than of ‘how’ something is transformed by the actor into visually and acoustically perceptible movements by the audience. It is ‘about setting conditions [which] make the appearance of a phenomenon possible’ (2013, p. 105), in this case an emotional atmosphere. Thus, the actual goal of the actor lies not, as in our case, in the creation of Zeitlichen Gegenständen (temporal objects) according to Husserl or Halbdingen (half-things/semi-things or, better, quasi-things) according to Schmitz – such as: Körperlichkeit (corporeality, body-ness), Lautlichkeit (phoneticality), Räumlichkeit (spatiality) – , but rather in the effect they have on the audience.
In the final analysis, it is not a matter of materializing things, in our particular case of emotionality and its determination as such, but of how this materialization of emotionality radiates into space and what it can achieve as producer of atmospheres (2013, p. 107). In this context, Böhme speaks of ecstasies instead of qualities, meaning the forms of expression of things. In that regard Böhme mentions Jakob Böhme (Böhme, 1922) and his way of approaching things. He compares things with the model of a musical instrument. According to him, the body is something like the soundboard of an instrument, and its external characteristics, called signatures by him, are moods that articulate its forms of expression. And finally, what things are is characterized by their tone and smell, the way in which they express their essence. (Böhme, 1922, p. 108). So ecstasies determine the atmospheres that a thing radiates (Böhme, 2013, p. 108). In our case, the emotionality is materialized through movement by the actor and the way in which it noticeably indicates its presence in space. In this way, the concept of presence in the sense of Aristotelian Parousia – the presence of something or someone in space – receives an entirely new energy under the light of the corporeality in space. This becomes completely clear through the optical and acoustic utterances of a person, which can thus be experienced in a bodily way, since these utterances are decisively co-determined by the manner of the movements (determined by their dynamics) through the body from which they emanate (2013, p. 166).
Consequences and Conclusions
Bodily awareness, in this way, becomes the key to the solution of a topic that has been vehemently discussed in theatre for centuries. It is about the dispute, whether an actor should act on stage more sensitively or rather distanced, which puts the topic of the actor’s identification with the fictitious theatrical figure to the test. An aesthetic production process in acting, fundamentally conditioned by the bodily awareness of the actor can overcome the conflict between a ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ actor. Thinking in categories such as ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ actor makes sense just because of a separation of mind and body, a separation of subject and object. If, however, one sees subject and object as mutually dependent dimensions within the framework of life process, in the sense of a self-objectification of a functioning, sentient body, hot and cold elements are naturally involved in this process. Body awareness as an experience and at the same time the consciousness of this experience through the process of self-objectification described above, show the way in which a mind-body separation can be theoretically and practically overcome.
If such thinking is now transferred to the aesthetic production process in acting, Plessner’s ‘I have and I am’ can be experienced in practice. This way enables the actor to approach a fictitious theatrical figure bodily/physically and subsequently embody it through a materialization process, without pursuing an identification process. The conscious inclusion of bodily awareness within the framework of aesthetic production processes in acting fundamentally changes the approach of the actor, since the process of materializing a fictitious theatrical figure is no longer based on mental structures and personal experiences from the subjective reality of the actor.
In my experience, both as a stage director and acting teacher, aesthetic production processes in acting taking all the above into consideration, including bodily awareness, provide a completely different quality of performance. This change in quality is reflected first in the way the actor embodies the theatrical figure on the stage and then in the effect it has on the audience. In this way the actor is able to concentrate entirely on the fictitious truth of the theatrical figure and then give believability to the action on stage in the form of a particular movement score. In addition, the actor’s responsibility to open to the audience, which is unable to move, as many facets of the theatrical figure as possible through the actor’s freedom to move on stage definitely affects the quality of the audience’s reception. Thus, the audience is able to form a more complete picture of the theatrical figure on the stage, which opens up deeper levels of meaning in the performance. In this way an acting approach which makes use of bodily awareness usually leads to body-oriented perception behavior, unless the audience is not affectively involved by what is presented on stage. At the same time, if the audience is affectively involved, the bodily experience that takes place can be seen as a modern form of catharsis, which subsequently leads the audience to a deeper awareness. Thus, one may finally come to the conclusion that bodily experience in the form of bodily awareness should be seen as a prerequisite for consciousness of any kind.
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In: Senses of Focusing, Vol. II, Nikos Kypriotakis, Judy Moore (ed.), Athens 2021